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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
SALT LAKE CITY, a
municipal corporation,

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

-vsUNITED PARK CITY MINES
COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.
11948

Defendant and
Respondent.

Respondent's Petition for Rehearing
and Brief in Support Thereof
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Respondent respectfully petitions the Court for a
rehearing in the above-entitled case. The grounds for
this petition are as follows:
Through its decision entered herein this Court
has reversed the Judgment below due to the
presence of error. The Court's opinion does
not deal with whether or not the error was
prejudicial. Under its prior decisions, this
Court has an obligation to examine the entire
record in order to determine the answer to that
question. Such an examination reveals that in
this case the error involved was harmless.
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\\THEREFORE, Respondent prays that a rehear·
ing be granted and that the Judgment of the District ,
Court be affirmed.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Clifford L. Ashton
Charles L. Maak
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent

Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING

In its opinion herein the Court observed that
"neither a judge nor a jury is permitted to go outside
the evidence to make a finding." The Court also noted
that in the proceedings below the District Court had
used a book not in evidence and had, unbeknownst to
the parties, prepared various exhibits of its own. The
Court then concluded that the Judgment below must
he reversed because of the impropriety of the methods
used by the trial judge.
The Defendant admits and has always admitted
that the actions of the District Court were improper
and constituted error. The presence of error, however,
does not ipso facto call for a reversal of a Judgment
being reviewed. This Court has often held that a reversal cannot be predicated upon error alone, but must
be based upon error tlze abt1e11ce of which likely would
have produced a different result:
Only when there is error both substantial and
pre.)uclicial, and wizen there is a reasonable
lil.:elihood that the result would have been dif·
f erent withont it, should error be regarded as
sufficient to upset a judgment or grant a new
trial.
Bowden v. Denver & R.G.fV.R.ll. Co., 3 Utah2d 444,
286 P .2d 240, 244 ( 1955) (Emphasis added). To the
same effect are the following cases: Startin v. Madsen,
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120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834, 836 ( 1951) ; In re JJicCoy'i
Estate, 91 Utah 212, 63 P.2d 620, 629 (1937); Kn-0w/.
ton v. Thompson, 62 Utah 142, 218 P. 117, 120-2!
(1923); Utah Banking Co. v. Newman,
138 P. 1146, 1148 (1914).

In its decision herein the Court failed to consider
whether or not the error involved was prejudicial. Defendant respectfully suhmits that the above-cited casei
make such an inquiry necessary. Defendant also
mits that under the prior decisions of this Court the
record in its entirety must be examined in order to determine whether or not an error is prejudicial. Such an
examination in this case will reveal that the District
Court's error was harmless.

As a general proposition, an error must be consid·
ered in the context of the entire record in determining
whether or not it is reversible error. See Thatcher v.
JJierriam, 121 Utah 191, 240 P.2d 266, 268 (1952);
Knowlton v. '1.'hompson, 62 Utah 142, 218 P. 117, 120-21
( 1923). This is particularly true in a case, such as the
one now before the Court, in which equitable relief ii
sought. The law on the point is exempJified by Stanley
v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P.2d 465 (1939).

That case, as is the instant one, was an action tc
quiet title. The specific issue involYed was whether or
uot a deed had been delivered. In his Concurring Opin·
ion, Justice Wolfe summarized and clarified the law
of Utah regarding the Supreme Court's functions ana
obligations in reviewing equity cases:
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I concur in the results. It would perhaps
be well if we fastened upon an accurate and
consistent expression of the jmlicial policy of
this court in the review of equity cases. The
Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, Sec. 9, not
only gives ns rmtlwrity but make.it it our duty
to re·ciew the facts. This has been construed to
mean that we review and weigh the evidence as
it appears in the record. Lund v. Howell, 92
Utah 232, ()7 P.2cl 215 (followed in Id., 92
Utah 250, ()7 P.2d 223); Christenson v. Nielsen, 88 Utah a:JG, 5-J. P.2d 430, 432 (where this
court held that in an equity case the appellate
court was "compelled to review the record and
pass on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence") ; Iluzianis v. Buzianis, 81 Utah 1, 16
P.2d 413 (where the court held that where
there was a conflict in the evidence it was the
court's duty "to pass upon the relative weight
thereof"). [97 Utah at .527].
I opine that what was really meant was
that on reriiew we would go over the record to
determine what our conclusions of fact were
from the transcript of the evidence, and if at
the end of that investigation we were in doubt
or even if there might be a slight preponderance
in our minds against the trial court's conclusions, we would affirm. [97 Utah at 529-30].
I think hardly accurate the expression in
Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., supra, that
the Supreme Court has the burden of detennin-
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ing "whether the findings of fact are supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence." Our dui.'I i!i: to make an independent
c.ramination of the record. If after that we find
( l) the prepo11derance of the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact, or ( 2) if
there is doubt in our minds as to where the preponderance lies, or ( 3) we think the evidence
as reYealed by the record may slightly preponderate against its conclusions hut such preponderance may well he offset in favor of his
conclusions by having seen the witnesses and
been ahlc to judge by their demeanor as to
their credibility, then we will not reverse. The
expressions that there must he a "clear" or
"fair" preponderance of the evidence against
the findings of the trial judge, seek to allow
for his adrnntagcd position in having seen the
beha\'ior of the witnesses on the stand.

In short, as held i11 TVilcox v. Cloward, 88

Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1, if after we review the
record we cannot .my that the court came to a
•wrong co11clusio11, we .<1lwuld affirm. [97 Utah
at 531]. (Emphasis added).

The views of .Justice \Volfe in Stanle.11 v. Stanley hare
been adopted by this Court. See Boccalero v. Bee, 102
Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1942).
The majority opinion in Stanley v. Stanlelf dealt
with whether the .Judgment below should be disturbed
due to the trial court's allegedly erroneous exclusion
and admission of various evidence. All of that evidentt
was directly related to the principal issue in the case-
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whether or not delivery of a deed had occurred. The
Court concluded that the J mlgment below should not
be disturbed. The majority opinion makes clear that,
in so concluding, the Court reviewed the entire record
a11d drew its onm factual conclusions:
Let it be here ob.tterved that it i.<t not contended that there i.<J not a substantial conflict
in the et•idcnce. The defendant, however, assigns as error the ruling of the court in excluding the defendant's testimony of the delivery
of the deed to her by the testator shortly after
its execution, and upon the same principle
that the court erred in not permitting her to
identify the signature of the testator to a document which, it is claimed, would tend to support her claim of ownership. It is further
contended by the defenclant that the court
should have excluded statements made by the
testator to third persons to the effect that he
owned the property. Had the court adopted
the defendant's theory and admitted the cvi·
drnce offered b!f the dcf n1dant and had excl11dt·d e'l.•idencc offcred b!J the vlaintiff over
drf endant'.<J ob}cction, that u:ould not, however,
dispo.'Je of the conflict, but it is in"isted that
etrcept for tht errors complained of the evi·
dcnce would have .Yo preponderated in favor
of the defendant a.'j to lead to 11 different con·
clusiou.

The testimony upon which the plaintiff
relies and which it is contended is inconsistent
with the defendant's claim that the deed was
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delivered to her, may be briefly summarized,
as follows .... [97 Utah at 523] .
. This te.ittimon.IJ •would undoubtedly justify
an wfcrence that the deed was delivered and
should be considered prima f acic sufficient for
that purpose. The inference is not conclusive,
nor would the presumption arising from the
possession of the deed by the defendant be conclusive .... (97 Utah at 525].
As ·we view the evidence in thi.it case the
findings of the trial court are ampl:IJ supported
by the evidence, and this would be true even
though the defendant had been permitted to
testify as to the manual delivery of the deed,
and quite as effechially disposes of all presumptions in the defendant's favor which
would cast the burden of proving non-delivery
upon the plaintiff.

There being no rever.'tible error, the judgment is affirmed . . . . [97 Utah at 527]
(Emphasis supplied).
Thus, in Stanle.lJ v. Stanley the appellant was able
to point to error the absence of which would have resulted in her being able to establish a prima facic case.
The Court did not automatically reverse because of that
error. Hather, it examined the
record and, on the
basis of that examination, concluded that even absent
the error the trial court's Judgment was amply SUP"
ported by the evidence. This Court has felt compelled
to similarly approach other equity cases before it for
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review. In N o1"es t•. Continental :Mining & 1llilling Co.,
6 Utah2d 177, ao8 P.2d 954 (1957), the Court stated:
This being a case in equity, it is our responsibility to review the et•frlence. In doing so
it is well to have in mind the general pattern
as to the scope of such review as set out in prior
adjudications in this court. 'Vhere there is a
conflict in the evidence, the finding of the trial
court will not be disturbed if the evidence preponderates in favor of the finding; nor, if the
ct•idence thereon is evenly balanced or it is
doubtful where the preponderance lies; nor,
even if its weight is slightl;lj against the finding of the trial court, but it will be overturned
and another finding made only if the evidence
clearly preponderates a{(ai11st his finding.
(Emphasis added) (Footnotes omitted).
To the same effect are Hrmdall v. Tracy Collins Trw1t
f'o .. n TTtah2d 18. 305 P .2d 480, 483 ( 1956) ; Reimann
l'. lla11m, IU Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387, 389 (1949);
Prowitt v. Lunt, 103 Utah 574, 137 P.2d 361, 362
(1943).
The case now before the Court presents a situation
analogous to that involved in Stanle11 v. Stanley. Here,
the evidence with respect to which error occurred consisted of several City graphs dealing with Big Cottonwood Canyon "computed runoff" and "effective precipitation." On their face, those graphs tended to support the City's assertion that an "unnatural decrease"
in Big Cottonwood Creek had occurred. The District
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Court concluded that the graphs had no probative
value. In arriving at that conclusion the District Court
used procedures which, as the Court has held, were inr
proper. Clearly, therefore, error occurred below. Under
Stanley ·u. Stanle,lj and the other decisions discussed
above, however, the mere presence of error does not
justify reversal of an equity case. Rather, the Court
has an obligation to examine the record in order to determine whether the error was prejudicial. Onl!J when
the record indicates that a diff crent re.mlt probably
would have obtained absent the error is reversal proper.
Defendant submits that the record establishes that the
same result would have come about even if the trial court
had not improperly analyzed a portion of the City's
evidence. llespondent's Brief originally filed herein
discusses in detail the basis for this assertion. It rests i
upon the two grounds summarized below.

The City exhibits to which the District Court
applied an improper method of analysis comprised but
a fragment of the City's evidence bearing on the "un·
natural decrease" issue. Under the authorities discussed
ahove, those exhibits must be considered in the context
of all the evidence and cannot be segregated from the
rest of the record. So considered, the few City graphs
which were improperly analyzed are of no particular
significance--u•hcther or not they are accepted at face
value. Because of the minimal role the City's "computed
runoff'-"effective precipitation" exhibits played in
the entire case, it appears highly unlikely that the trial
court's acceptance of the graphs would have caused 6
1.
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different result in this case. Accordingly, under the
decisions of this Court the error associated therewith
does not warrant a reversal. See Bowden v. Denver &
R.G.JV.R.R.Co., 3 Utah2d 444, 286 P.2d 240, 244
(1955) (quoted .ttnpra).
2. The result of the trial court's error was the
conclusion that the City's effective precipitation-computed runoff exhibits had no probative value. The .
reason given by the lower court for this conclusion was
admittedly erroneous. Under prior decisions of this
Court, however, the impropriety of a reason is irrelevant
if the conclusion is correct:

'¥"e are of the opinion the trial court
reached the correct result. There may be some
inconsistencies and troubles to harmonize the
findings and conclusions reached. In an equity
case, a correct resnlt ttill be supported even
though crroneons rea.11ons were given therefor.
(Emphasis added).
Federal Land Bank v. Salt Lake Valley Sand & Gravel
Co., 96 Utah 359, 85 P .2d 791, 793 ( 1939) ; see Tree v.
White, 110 Utah 233, 171 P.2d 398, 399 (1946). For
reasons completely independent of the District Court's
error, its conclusion that the graphs lacked probative
value was correct. The record establishes the following
regarding the exhibits involved:
(a) All of the City's effective precipitation-computed runoff exhibits were based upon the use of an

12
11 % "carry-over coef ficicnt" for Big Cottonwood Can-.

yon. That coefficient was pure hearsay and the exhibits
dependent upon it were thus not even properly in ed.
dcnce.

(b) Accuracy requires that in computing "effec.
tive precipitation" one employ as many actual precipi·
tation stations as possible. The 11 % carry-oYer coeffi.
cient for Big Cottonwood Canyon had itself been
derived through the use of nine or ten stations. How.
ever, the precipitation data which underlay its graphs
and against which the City applied the 11 % coefficient
was based on 011l,1; one .r;tation. That one station is located high in the Canyon and receives twice as much precipitation as falls in the lower reaches of Big Cotton·
wood. Thus, in its "ef'fective precipitation" exhibits
the City utilized precipitation records which greatly
distorted-in its own favor-the amount of precipitll·
tion which falls on the Canyon as a whole.
( c) The location of the "mean" line of the City's
Exhibit P-50 (the line used to determine "computed
runoff") was shown to be wholly unreliable statistically.
( d) The City's exhibits relating to computed runoff totally ignored changes in Canyon vegetation, not·
withstanding that such changes have a tremendous ef·
f ect on runoff.
( e) The City's graphs completely failed to take
into account the fact that the early 1930's was a
transitory period with respect to the relationship between
precipitation and runoff in the entire Great Basin.
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( f) In arnvmg at the "actual runoff" figures
against which it compared "computed runoff," the City
totally overlooked all water discharged from the
Wnsatch Drain Tunnel, even though it is connected
with the Cardiff Mine in Big Cottonwood Canyon.

The record therefore establishes that the District
Court's conclusion regarding the City's effective precipitation-computed runoff exhibits was dictated by
evidence and considerations entirely unrelated to the
improper means used in analyzing those exhibits. Consequently. under the decisions of this Court the error
was not prejudicial.
For the foregoing reasons Defendant respectfully
submits that the Court should grant a rehearing in this
case, that the entire record should be examined so as to
determine whether or not the error involved was prejudicial, and that such an examination reveals that the
error in fact does not justify a reversal.
VAN COTI, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Clifford L. Ashton
Charles L. Maak
Attorney., for Defendant
and Respondent

Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

